

TOP SECRET**SECURITY INFORMATION**

September 19, 1952

25X1

25X1

DRS Comments on NIE-42/1I. General Comments on Yugoslav-Albanian Relations

The draft does not seem to contain a clear picture of current Yugoslav policy on Albania. During the past year this policy appears to have taken into consideration all possible future developments in Albania. In their public statements the Yugoslav leaders, including Tito, have declared that Yugoslavia favors a "free and independent" Albania within its present boundaries and a hands-off policy on the part of non-Balkan powers, meaning specifically Italy. The Yugoslavs have repeatedly declared that the Albanian people themselves will dispose of the Hoxha regime in due time.

25X1

Concurrently, Belgrade has continued to maintain unrelenting psychological and physical pressure on Albania.

25X1

appears

to have been designed to increase political pressure against the Hoxha regime and to provide a counter influence to the Albanian political groups in the West, especially the American-sponsored National Committee for a Free Albania.

State Dept. review completed

At present there is little likelihood that Yugoslavia would

Document No.

Review of this document by CIA has determined that

☒ CIA has no objection to declass☐ It contains information of CIA interest that must remain classified at TS S C**TOP SECRET****SECURITY INFORMATION**

Approved For Release 2005/01/17 : CIA-RDP79R01012A001300010003-2

DOCUMENT NO. 1010
 NO CHANGE IN CLASS. 1
☐ DECLASSIFIED
 CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C
 NEXT REVIEW DATE: 10/1/70
 DATE: _____ REVIEWER: _____

25X1

TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

seems to favor the continued existence of an Albania which, although completely ruled by Moscow stooges, is at least considered de jure independent. In his propaganda campaign directed both to the East and the West Tito has laid great stress on the non-aggressive aspects of his brand of socialism. In connection with this campaign, he has maintained consistently (1) that his government is a peaceful one; (2) that it is possible for a socialist government to live in peace with its neighbors, especially non-socialist neighbors; and (3) that the impression created in the West that "aggression" and "socialism" are synonymous stems from the imperialist practices of the Soviet Union. Thus, according to Belgrade, the continued survival of the Hoxha regime stands in mute testimony of the non-aggressive intentions of the Tito regime.

For Belgrade to attempt an overthrow of the Albanian Government at the present would require, inter alia, the following: (1) extensive propaganda preparation explaining and justifying the conditions making a forceful move necessary; (2) complete accord with Greece, particularly regarding the issue of North Epirus; and (3) a considerable buildup of Yugoslav military preparations along the Albanian border, and especially the training and equipment of a large number of Kosovars. However, Yugoslav aggression against Albania would be impossible without involving Yugoslavia in major difficulties with the Western Powers, especially the US and UK. The only situation involving overt use of force against Albania that seems plausible at present would be the

TOP SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

outbreak of a general war, in which case Yugoslavia would move immediately into Albania to protect its rear.


II. Comments by Section

Suggested wording of paragraph a:
1. a. "Disaffection within the Albanian regime and party, including

the security police, which has been endemic since the Tito defection in 1948, is continuing. Not only is the vast majority of the population opposed to the present regime, but elements of those connected with the party and government, especially at the middle and lower levels, are showing signs of dissatisfaction."

section
This paragraph ignores certain positive aspects of the recent internal developments in Albania, such as the expansion of the industrial capacities of the country, increased economic assistance from the Soviet orbit countries, the regime's ability to deal with resistance and espionage, and expansion of military capabilities.

25X1



2. An internal revolt in Albania seems inconceivable without large-scale defections in the army and the security forces, both of which appear at present to be firmly controlled by Soviet officers and trusted Albanian officers trained in the USSR.

3. The size of the Albanian emigration in Yugoslavia, "6,000 strong," given in this section seems to be an exaggeration. Yugoslav official figures were given as 3,124 in March 1952 and as 3,500 in August.

TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

25X1

Approved For Release 2005/04/27 : CIA-RDP79R01012A001300010003-2

Approved For Release 2005/04/27 : CIA-RDP79R01012A001300010003-2